‘Snapchat Expert’ Fails To Undo $26M Underride Crash Verdict

The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed a $26.1 million judgment arising from a catastrophic underride crash, rejecting arguments that statements made during closing improperly elevated a lay witness into an “expert” and tainted the verdict. The ruling leaves in place a Linn County jury’s allocation of fault and damages against West Side Transport Inc. and its driver, Clifford Takes, after a collision that left Margaret McQuillen with severe and permanent injuries, including a traumatic brain injury. The decision also provides guidance on how appellate courts assess alleged misconduct in closing argument, particularly where the challenged characterization aligns with the substance of testimony and was not met with contemporaneous objection.

The Underride Crash and the Jury’s Allocation of Fault

The case stems from a two-vehicle collision in which McQuillen’s car traveled beneath the trailer of a commercial truck, shearing off the top of the passenger vehicle. According to the plaintiffs’ theory, Takes executed an unsafe and unprotected left turn across oncoming traffic, placing the truck and trailer in McQuillen’s path. The lawsuit was filed by McQuillen’s parents and sought recovery for extensive, long-term harms attributed to the crash, including permanent neurological injury.

A Linn County jury returned a verdict totaling $35.8 million in damages against the trucking company and its driver. The jury also attributed comparative fault to McQuillen, finding her 27% responsible. Applying Iowa’s comparative fault framework, the trial court entered a final judgment of $26.1 million. On appeal, the defendants did not secure relief from the damages figure through fault-allocation arguments; instead, they focused on trial-advocacy issues, contending that statements in closing argument—especially the “Snapchat expert” label—so undermined the fairness of the proceedings that a new trial was required.

The “Snapchat Expert” Dispute and the Supreme Court’s Evidentiary Framing

A central defense theme was that McQuillen had been using Snapchat shortly before the collision, supporting an argument that she acted negligently by distraction. In response, the plaintiffs called McQuillen’s friend, Grace Lubben, to address Snapchat functionality. Lubben testified that after learning of the crash she used a Snapchat feature that displayed a user’s location, and that McQuillen’s last known location appeared to be at home. As presented to the jury, this testimony was offered to rebut the inference that McQuillen was actively using the app at the time of the crash, an issue that often overlaps with social media discovery in personal injury litigation.

On appeal, West Side argued that plaintiffs’ counsel improperly referred to Lubben as a “Snapchat expert,” emphasizing that she was a lay witness and pointing to concessions by the defense’s digital forensics expert that he did not use Snapchat and lacked familiarity with the geolocation feature. The Iowa Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that Lubben’s descriptions were “fairly technical” and resembled the sort of information an expert might provide, and that the testimony was given without objections from defense counsel. The court stated, “We see no problem with the McQuillens’ counsel describing Lubben as an expert on Snapchat,” reasoning that where a witness effectively provides expert-type testimony, characterizing her as an expert did not, on these facts, justify a new trial.

Closing Argument Limits, Discretion, and Why the Verdict Stood

The defendants also challenged other portions of plaintiffs’ closing, asserting counsel suggested negligence theories outside the jury instructions. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a limited portion of the argument was improper, but it credited the trial court’s assessment that the misstep did not rise to the level warranting a new trial. In the court’s view, the record supported a finding that the statements were not an intentional effort to mislead the jury, and the overall context of the trial did not indicate that the improper remarks likely changed the outcome.

The opinion further emphasized the trial court’s vantage point in evaluating the impact of advocacy on a jury, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard to the denial of posttrial relief. The court also noted that the defense’s digital forensics testimony was central to the comparative fault narrative, making it “fair game” for the plaintiffs to challenge the claimed authority of that evidence—including by contrasting the defense expert’s unfamiliarity with Snapchat against a daily user’s functional knowledge. In high-exposure crash cases like this, issues of speed, visibility, and vehicle dynamics are often framed through accident reconstruction evidence and testimony. According to court filings, the plaintiffs were represented by Pickens Barnes & Abernathy, among other counsel. More broadly, the decision underscores that appellate courts are reluctant to disturb substantial verdicts absent a clear showing of prejudicial error that likely affected the result.